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Abstract: With the advancement of science and technology, the use of nuclear 
energy has become a necessity in recent years due to extreme energy shortages. As 
such, some States favor using spent nuclear fuel from nuclear reactors as a form 
of energy. This has increasingly led to the international trade of nuclear materials, 
mainly spent nuclear fuel. Most commonly, this trade takes place via clandestine 
sea transportation. Because of the clandestine nature of this transportation, issues 
arise as conflicts between traditional navigational freedom laws and the protection 
of the marine environment and human safety, the applicability of precautionary 
principle, requirements of prior notice, and assumption of liability of States. In 
particular, Japan is one of the major States transporting nuclear materials by sea. 
Despite the clandestine shipping lanes, such Japanese transportation undoubtedly 
navigates through the South China Sea and Taiwan Straits. Therefore, China must 
be aware of issues regarding clandestine transportation of nuclear materials by 
considering theories of international law and the potential threats that it faces. In 
doing so, China should seek cooperative solutions to safeguard itself against the 
dangers posed by those States transporting nuclear materials.
Key Words: Clandestine transportation of nuclear materials; Freedom of 
navigation; Marine environment
Nuclear materials are the substance of considerable destruction. Exposure to 
radiation can lead to death, cancer, genetic variations and other consequences to 
humans. Accordingly, the international community has strict control over highly-
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radioactive nuclear materials. However, due to global energy shortages, some States 
now favor nuclear energy. Advancements in science and technology have given 
rise to its more prevalent use as an alternative form of energy. As such, exporting 
processed nuclear materials has significantly increased. Transporting nuclear 
materials via sea has the potential to create great threats to costal States, with 
some of these States opposing sea transportation. This has led to sharp conflicts of 
interests between coastal States and transporting States.
Transporting nuclear materials by sea involves the following legal disputes: 
disputes between freedom of navigation and the marine environmental protection, 
application of precautionary principle, and the necessity of prior notification, 
among other concerns.
I. Dispute between Freedom of Navigation and 
     the Marine Environment and Human Safety
The traditional navigational freedoms when transporting nuclear materials 
are constrained by requirements to protect both human safety and the marine 
environment. Severe disputes can occur between the States that transport nuclear 
materials and coastal States. These disputes arise where States transporting nuclear 
materials argue that, based on the principles of navigational freedom, ships carrying 
nuclear substances are not required to give prior notice to coastal States just as prior 
notice is not required of other materials. Coastal States argue that safeguarding 
life and protecting the marine environment, traditional navigational freedoms shall 
not be applicable to ships transporting nuclear materials and thus, these States 
require prior notification and the application of precautionary principle. Examining 
international law regimes can help guide in balancing the interests of these States.
A. Regimes under International law in Relation to 
    Freedom of Navigation
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 
Geneva Conventions, and international customary law, all have legal regimes 
that regulate transporting highly-radioactive spent-nuclear fuel by sea. Currently, 
most States apply the provisions of the UNCLOS, so it is necessary to analyze the 
regimes under the UNCLOS and the Geneva Conventions in relation to freedom of 
navigation.
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1. Regime of Passage in the Territorial Sea – Innocent Passage
Ships of all States, whether costal or landlocked, enjoy the right of innocent 
passage through territorial seas, according to the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone and the UNCLOS.1 Although this right includes passage 
through territorial seas, it is not limited to passage. The right also includes stopping 
and anchoring. However, stopping and anchoring must be incidental to ordinary 
navigation, rendered necessary by force majeure or distress, or for rendering 
assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress.2 UNCLOS provides 
that coastal States shall not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships through 
the territorial sea except in accordance with the UNCLOS.3 However, the UNCLOS 
also vests appropriate right of protection to the coastal State, meaning that the 
coastal State can take necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent non-innocent 
passage.4
The UNCLOS takes an objectivity-based point of view in terms of verification 
standard of the right of innocent passage. This standard bases the right of innocent 
passage on actual actions rather than subjective purposes.5 UNCLOS says that 
passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with the 
UNCLOS as well as with other rules of international law. Accordingly, the coastal 
State has the right to take necessary actions in its territorial sea to prevent any non-
innocent passage.6 With prior notice, the coastal State may, without discrimination 
in form or in fact among foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its 
territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential 
for the protection of its security, including weapons exercises.7 Furthermore, 
passage of a foreign ship that is prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of 
the coastal State shall not be considered innocent passage. Of course, the coastal 
State has the right to judge the passage of the ship to which a potential incident 
1       UNCLOS, Art. 17. 
2       UNCLOS, Art. 18(2). 
3       UNCLOS, Art. 24. 
4       UNCLOS, Art. 25(1).
5      As declared by the 1930 Hague Conference, “Passage is not innocent when a vessel makes 
use of the territorial sea of a coastal State for the purpose of doing any act prejudicial to the 
security, to the public policy or to the fiscal interests of that State.” League of Nations Doc. 
C. 351 (b). M. 145(b), 1930, p.217.
6       UNCLOS, Art. 25(1). 
7       UNCLOS, Art. 25(3). 
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may occur and which creates a catastrophic disaster to the coastal State.
The sovereignty of the coastal State extends to its territorial sea area and it can 
enact laws and regulations that are applicable in such areas. It can do so in order 
to prevent, reduce, or control ship-induced pollution from foreign ships, including 
those entitled to innocent passage, so long as the laws and regulations do not 
violate the regime of innocent passage as provided for in Chapter Three, Part II, of 
the UNCLOS.
2. Passage Regime Applicable to Straits Used for 
International Navigation – Transit Passage
UNCLOS set forth provisions respecting the straits used for international 
navigation. These provisions have granted passing ships more freedoms that 
largely cancel conditional requirements set forth for innocent passage. With 
certain exceptions, this Convention stipulates that the regime of transit passage 
is applicable to the straits used for international navigation between one part of 
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas 
or an exclusive economic zone.8 The UNCLOS does not allow coastal States to 
interrupt a ship during transit passage. In addition, it does not set forth “innocence” 
as a general requirement of transit passage. However, the UNCLOS does put the 
following limitations on the regime of transit passage:
Transit passage must be the exercise of the freedom of navigation and over-
flight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit. This requirement 
of continuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage through the strait 
for the purpose of entering, leaving or returning from a State bordering the strait, 
subject to the conditions of entry to that State.9
Ships in transit passage shall (1) comply with generally accepted international 
regulations, procedures and practices for safety at sea, including the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea; and (2) comply with generally 
accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution from ships.10 Further, ships and aircraft, while 
exercising the right of transit passage, shall (1) proceed without delay through or 
over the strait; (2) refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering the strait, or in 
8       UNCLOS, Art. 37.
9       UNCLOS, Art. 38(2).
10     UNCOLOS, Art. 39(2). 
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any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in 
the Charter of the United Nations; and (3) refrain from any activities other than 
those incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless 
rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress.11 As part of transit passage, 
it is also required that foreign ships, including marine scientific research and 
hydrographic survey ships, may not carry out any research or survey activities 
without the prior authorization of the States bordering straits.12
When activities irrelevant to the exercise of the right of transit passage are 
carried out, the ship in transit passage shall comply with other applicable provisions 
of the UNCLOS.13 Such activity shall be subject to the regime of innocent passage 
that are applicable to the territorial sea, meaning that if the passage is not innocent, 
the coastal State has the right to interrupt passage. If the passage does not comply 
with the requirement of continuous and expeditious passage as set forth in 
Paragraph 2, Article 38 of the UNCLOS, the regime of transit passage will not be 
applicable.14
The UNCLOS stipulates the laws and regulations respecting transit passage 
of the States bordering straits can adopt laws and regulations with respect to transit 
passage through straits in relation to all or any of the following items so long as 
such laws and regulations do not discriminate in form or substance among foreign 
ships, or in their application have the practical effect of denying, hampering or 
impairing the right of transit passage as defined in this chapter. Besides, they shall 
make applicable international law in relation to discharge of oil, oil pollution waste 
and other hazardous substances in straits effective in order to prevent, reduce and 
control pollution.15
States bordering straits can take appropriate actions against ships that have 
caused severe damage or pose threat of causing severe damage to the marine 
environment of straits in violation of the laws and regulations as specified in 
Items (a) and (b), Paragraph 1, Article 42 of the UNCLOS except those entitled to 
sovereign immunity.16
If a foreign ship other than those entitled to sovereign immunity has committed 
11    UNCLOS, Art. 39(1).
12    UNCLOS, Art. 40. 
13    UNCLOS, Art. 38(3). 
14   Duncan E. J. Currie, The Right to Control Passage of Nuclear Transport Vessels under 
International Law, at http://www.globelaw.com/Nukes/, 5 October 2006.
15      UNCLOS, Art. 42(2).
16      UNCLOS, Art. 233.
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2006 No. 1)522
a violation of the laws and regulations referred to in Paragraphs 1(a) and (b), Article 
42, the UNCLOS, causing or threatening major damage to the marine environment 
of the straits, the States bordering the straits may take appropriate enforcement 
measures.
Overall, although the UNCLOS makes looser provisions than those in respect 
of the right of innocent passage for straits used for international navigation, it 
emphasizes the safety rules to be abided by while passing through the straits used 
for such navigation, in particular, the rules aiming to prevent any pollution at sea.
3. Regime of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage
The UNCLOS has set forth special international law regimes for archipelagic 
States or States constituted by interrelated islands. In pursuance of the provisions 
of Article 47 of the UNCLOS, an archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic 
baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs 
of the archipelago. The waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines are called 
archipelagic waters, of which the archipelagic State enjoys sovereignty.17 Based on 
the special provisions of the UNCLOS, archipelagic sea lanes passage is applicable 
to these waters. An important difference between this right and the right of innocent 
passage is that ships are only entitled to innocent passage within the scope of sea 
lanes as designated by an archipelagic State. If an archipelagic State does not 
designate sea lanes, ships can exercise the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage 
through the lanes used for international navigation under normal conditions.18
4. Regime of Passage in Exclusive Economic Zone
An exclusive economic zone refers to the waters that do not extend beyond 
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
sea is measured. According to the provisions of the UNCLOS, a coastal State has 
sovereign rights of protecting and preserving the marine environment in this area.19 
Article 58 of the UNCLOS prescribes that in the exclusive economic zone, all 
States, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of 
this Convention, the freedoms of navigation and over-flight referred to in Article 
87. The UNCLOS also provides that in exercising its rights and performing its 
duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall 
have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner 
17    UNCLOS, Art. 49.
18    UNCLOS, Art. 53.
19    UNCLOS, Art. 56(2)(c).
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compatible with the provisions of this Convention.20 Furthermore, Articles 88 to 
115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic 
zone as far as they are not incompatible with this Part. Pertinent provisions 
in respect to the freedom of navigation on the high seas are applicable to the 
navigational right of ships in the exclusive economic zone. However, the author 
argues that this does not mean that the ship carrying nuclear materials enjoys 
total freedom of navigation because, among other things, the UNCLOS sets forth 
provisions for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, and the 
conservation and management of living resources. The transportation of highly 
radioactive materials by sea can undoubtedly impose destructive influences on the 
marine environment and its living resources because of leakage due to accidents. 
Therefore, in the exclusive economic zone, ships carrying nuclear materials need 
to comply with pertinent rules, especially the constraint under the precautionary 
principle.
The UNCLOS provides for certain limitations, as well. In particular, it requires 
that ships granted navigational freedom rights respect the interests of coastal 
States to protect the marine environment and human safety. The Preamble of the 
UNCLOS stipulates that, “recognizing the desirability of establishing through this 
Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the 
seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will promote 
the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of 
their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection 
and preservation of the marine environment.” From this perspective, efficient 
communication as well as preservation and protection of marine environment are 
important purposes of the UNCLOS. Thus, the extent of navigational freedom 
allocated to which ships carrying nuclear materials are entitled is an important issue 
that deserves further discussion.
B. International Law Respecting the of Protection of the 
    Marine Environment and Human Safety
Presently, the protection and preservation of the marine environment are 
important contents of jurisdiction of coastal States. According to Article 194 of the 
UNCLOS: 1. States are obliged to protect and preserve the marine environment 
20    UNCLOS, Art. 56(2).
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and shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent with 
this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable 
means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities, and they shall 
endeavor to harmonize their policies in this connection; 2. States shall take all 
measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control 
are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their 
environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their 
jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise 
sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention; and 3. The measures 
taken pursuant to this Part shall deal with all sources of pollution of the marine 
environment. These measures shall include, inter alia, those designed to minimize 
pollution to the fullest possible extent, including (b) pollution from vessels, 
in particular measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, 
ensuring the safety of operations at sea, preventing intentional and unintentional 
discharges, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and 
manning of vessels. The Convention also stipulates that in taking measures to 
prevent, reduce or control pollution of the marine environment, States shall 
refrain from unjustifiable interference with activities carried out by other States 
in the exercise of their rights and in pursuance of their duties in conformity with 
this Convention.21 Thus, the UNCLOS is balancing the protection of the marine 
environment and the protection of freedom of activities at sea to safeguard the 
smooth performance of activities at sea with the precondition of not allowing the 
destruction of the marine environment.
Additionally, as prescribed in Paragraph 7, Article 220 of the UNCLOS, 
notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 6, whenever appropriate procedures 
have been established, either through the competent international organization or 
as otherwise agreed, whereby compliance with requirements for bonding or other 
appropriate financial security has been assured, the coastal State if bound by such 
procedures shall allow the vessel to proceed. Pursuant to international law, both 
customary and conventional, States have the right to take and enforce measures 
beyond their territorial sea that are proportionate to the actual or threatened damage 
to protect their coastline or related interests, including fishing, from pollution or 
threat of pollution following a maritime casualty or acts relating to such a casualty 
21    UNCLOS, Art. 194.
International Law Issues Regarding Clandestine Transportation of 
Nuclear Materials by Sea 525
that may reasonably result in major harmful consequences.
The provision discussed above are those pertinent under the UNCLOS in order 
to protect the marine environment. They constitute the counter-restriction of the 
right of freedom of navigation of the ships carrying nuclear materials.
Human safety is another issue of international law that is contradictory to the 
freedom of navigation. Relative to the freedom of navigation for ships, interests 
respecting human safety are more important. Where the transportation of nuclear 
materials imposes or potentially imposes critical safety interests of any State, such 
State has the right to discontinue the act of transporting nuclear materials.22 States 
have the right to discontinue the transportation of nuclear materials without prior 
notice, because such an act is either prejudicial to the peace, good order or national 
security of the coastal State or in violation of pertinent laws and regulations of the 
international community. The UNCLOS lists the acts that are prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or national security of the coastal State. Without a doubt, any act 
listed under Article 19 in the territorial sea of a coastal State are prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or national security of the coastal State, but this Article does not 
include all of the harmful acts. Hence, any activity beyond the acts of Article 19 
are also prejudicial to the peace, good order or tranquility of the coastal State if it 
causes catastrophic damage to the environment of the coastal State.23 The Canadian 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act that Canada enacted in 1970 has similar 
provisions. The Canadian Government considers preventing environmental damage 
as one of the most important self-defense mechanisms.24 Primary considerations 
under traditional principles of international law were given to navigational 
freedoms of the flag-State ships. But it is these same flag States in the international 
community, that at present, are transporting highly radioactive spent nuclear 
fuel accompanied by numerous hazards, which will inevitably pose considerable 
threats to the peace, tranquility and good order of the coastal State when a 
maritime casualty occurs. Apparently, in this case, it is not appropriate to invoke 
22    UNCLOS, Art. 25(3).
23    UNCLOS, Art. 19. 
24   See 9 ILM 607,610. The Canadian reply to a United States protest also further stated 
that “Such concepts are particularly relevant, however, to an area having the unique 
characteristics of the Arctic, where there is an intimate relationship between the sea, the ice 
and the land, and where the permanent defilement of the environment could occur and result 
in the destruction of whole species.” It should be noted that this was over twenty years ago 
and subsequent to the Rio declaration and the entry into force of UNCLOS the rights and 
duties of coastal states to protect the environment have been further extended. 
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the old principles under international law because it cannot protect the interests in 
connection with the marine environment of the entire international community.
C. Result of Harmonization of This Issue by the 
    International Community – Traffic Separation Schemes
The international community has made great efforts to harmonize the 
contradiction between the need to transport nuclear materials and the protection 
of the marine environment and human safety. As a compromise of these interests, 
UNCLOS created separate sea-lanes for transporting nuclear materials and the right 
of innocent passage.
The UNCLOS set out special provision in Article 22 because it foresaw the 
potential conflict between the right of innocent passage of ships transporting 
nuclear materials and the costal States’ need to protect the marine environment. 
These special provisions allow costal States to designate certain sea lanes for the 
passage of ships carrying nuclear substances to enjoy the right of innocent passage 
only in certain sea lanes.25 As stipulated in Article 22(2), in particular, tankers, 
nuclear-powered ships, ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or 
noxious substances or materials may be required by the coastal State to confine 
their passage to such sea lanes. A similar regime of sea lanes and traffic separation 
schemes are also set forth in the regimes for straits used for international navigation 
and archipelagic waters.
This separation of sea lanes aims to harmonize the relationship between 
freedom of navigation and the need to protect the marine environment by coastal 
States. It not only supports the proposition that ships carrying nuclear substances or 
materials enjoy the right of innocent passage, but also safeguards the sovereignty 
over territorial sea areas of coastal States and stands up for the need of protecting 
interests of the marine environment. Another balance between these interests is 
found in the provisions set forth by the International Code of Safe Carriage of 
Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-level Radioactive Wastes on Aboard 
Ships (hereinafter “INF Code”)26 as well as in the stipulations and safeguard 
measures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding cross-
25    UNCLOS, Arts. 22, 23. 
26     The INF Code entered into force officially by being adopted by the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in 2001 and it mainly sets forth operational 
procedures and condition requirements in respect of transportation of nuclear materials. 
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border transportation of nuclear materials. 
Although disastrous consequences can result from transporting nuclear 
materials, nuclear energy trade has become necessary due to global energy 
shortages. Because of this, it is unwise for costal States and States transporting 
nuclear materials to stand on opposing ground. Transporting States should not 
request the entitlement to the right of navigational freedom, including the right of 
innocent passage, while at the same time, costal States cannot refuse the passage of 
ships carrying nuclear substances. States requesting the right of innocent passage 
should recognize that transporting nuclear materials is anything but innocent. To the 
contrary, these transports pose the threat of nuclear material leakage that can have 
a fatal and irreversible threat to the surrounding environment. Insisting on the right 
of innocent passage in this manner is an irresponsible and irrational argument. By 
contrast, repeated hampering by costal States to the passage of ships transporting 
nuclear materials will force these ships to use clandestine shipping lanes in order to 
avoid detection and monitoring by costal States. Thus States transporting nuclear 
materials and coastal States should cooperate with each other frankly and sincerely, 
recognizing the necessity of regulation and promotion of the use of nuclear energy. 
Without any other alternative, the traffic separation scheme currently used is the 
most suitable solution to transporting nuclear materials by sea.
II. Application of the Precautionary Principle 
     in Transporting Nuclear Materials by Sea
A. Background and Meaning of the Precautionary Principle
No simple and clear legal definition exists for the expression of “precautionary 
principle.” Some German scholars believe that the precautionary principle first 
appeared in national legislation of West Germany and Switzerland in the 1980s, 
when the so called “Vorsorgeprinzip” existed in the legal systems of these two 
States.27 Because we lack scientific data on the exact sources of human pollution 
creating global destruction of the environment and ecosystems, “precautionary 
methods” with excessive carefulness are preferred for immediate pollution 
management rather than allowing unmitigated pollution. Such a basic stance is 
27    Kuen-chen FU, Essays on International Law of the Sea, Xiamen: Xiamen University Press, 
2004, pp. 97~98. (in Chinese)
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called “precautionary principle.”28
B. Significance of the Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle is a policy orientation, requiring policy-makers 
to have foresight. To reduce environmental damage or the threat of such damage, 
this policy requires immediate implementation, even in the absence of scientific 
data that shows how the serious the damage will be.29 Accordingly, international 
law does not allow an excuse of uncertainty to buy policy makers time in the 
implementation. Similarly, States, even in the face of this scientific uncertainty, 
should not delay in issuing injunctions against acts that potentially cause 
environmental damage. The Netherlands has drafted a discussion paper asserting 
the point of view that implementation of the precautionary principle has two focal 
points: (1) adopt preventive standards and norms, and (2) activate procedures that 
have a preventive effect.30 The later emphasizing on timeliness: implementation of 
the precautionary principle excludes the practice of waiting for definite scientific 
data before taking any action. Instead, it requires immediate action in case of any 
occurrence. Even if there is no certainty of environmental pollution, action should 
occur beforehand to ensure environmental protection.
In fact, the precautionary principle reverses the burden of proof, meaning 
that burden of proof is shifted to the actor (the polluter) when environmental 
damages are uncertain. It requires that the actor prove the acts do not cause 
environmental pollution. As such, this exempts the burden of proof by the States 
that could potentially suffer pollution damage. Through theoretical analysis, this 
is an impartial practice putting forth higher requirements on actors to protect 
the environment and mitigate potential environmental threats. After all, it is 
considerably difficult, unrealistic, and infeasible for States suffering damage caused 
by pollution to bear the burden of proof or estimate the damage to the marine 
environment caused by an act conducted by another State. Therefore, through the 
policy of the precautionary principle, States transporting hazardous materials will 
28     Kuen-chen FU, Essays on International Law of the Sea, Xiamen: Xiamen University Press, 
2004, pp. 97~98. (in Chinese)
29   Relevance and Application of the Principle of Precautionary Action to the Caribbean 
Environment Programme, CEP Technical Report, No. 21, 1993, p. 3.
30   Eugnene R. Fidell, Maritime Transportation of Plutonium and Spent Nuclear Fuel, 
International Lawyer, Vol. 31, 1997, p. 757.
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pay closer attention to the safety and prudence of their acts by bearing the burden 
of proof. Undoubtedly, this burden shifting is conducive to better environmental 
protections.
Following the provisions of the UNCLOS relating to the protection and 
maintenance of the marine environment, States shall be committed to, based on 
national policies, current situations, resources and other factors, striving to prevent, 
reducing and controlling the worsening of the marine environment. In following the 
provisions of UNCLOS, these States will be able maintain and improve production 
capacities. In a final analysis, it is necessary to endeavor to apply the precautionary 
principle to prevent marine environmental pollution and to prevent the deterioration 
of marine environments by reducing long-term, irreversible negative influences on 
the marine environment.31
Similarly, flag State of ships carrying nuclear materials should also adopt the 
precautionary principle to prevent potentially severe damage to the environment 
due to nuclear accidents. Flag States and the States transporting nuclear materials 
shall be responsible for the acts of their ships as coastal States are responsible for 
their territorial sea, contiguous zones and exclusive economic zones. This means 
that in accordance with the precautionary principle, the States transporting nuclear 
materials shall perform an assessment on the environmental influence and work out 
safe solutions that shall be submitted to the coastal State or relevant international 
organization in order to confirm compliance of such transportation with the 
requirements of environmental and safety standards.
III. Application of the Obligation of Prior Notification
Another dispute of the interpretation of the right of innocent passage and the 
scope of its application stems from differing points of view on the obligation of 
prior notification of passage. Nuclear-capable States or the States transporting 
nuclear materials argue that the obligation of prior notification contradicts the 
freedom of navigation provided for by the UNCLOS. However, it is necessary 
to recognize that in practice, these States most often give prior notification when 
navigating through the waters of trusted States and political allies.32 On December 
31     Agenda 21, Chapter 17. 17. 22.
32   Eugnene R. Fidell, Maritime Transportation of Plutonium and Spent Nuclear Fuel, 
International Lawyer, Vol. 31, 1997, p. 757.
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18, 1997, Japan declared that it would announce the shipping route of a ship 
carrying nuclear materials from France after it set sail in 1998. Similarly, the U.K. 
gave the Panama Canal Commission prior notification of its transportation activities 
to pass through the Panama Canal in 1998. However, smaller States throughout the 
Caribbean did not receive any prior notification. This shows how nuclear-capable 
States use double standards when it comes to prior notification by considering 
smaller and weaker States as “second-class members” of the international 
community. Clearly, such double standards go against the important principle 
of international law that States are all equal, whether small or large, making the 
double standard unfair and unacceptable.
A. Necessity of Prior Notification
Prior notification plays two roles: (1) when made to relevant States, 
transparency is improved by reducing rumors of nuclear material transportation 
by sea and avoiding disturbance in the international community, and (2) States are 
able to make effective preparations beforehand for potential maritime accidents 
resulting from cross-border transport of nuclear materials. Furthermore, pertinent 
international conventions, such as the Basel Convention, and relevant regulations 
of the IAEA, prescribe notification as an important obligation of the States 
transporting nuclear materials.
B. State Practice in Relation to Prior Notification
There are numerous past cases of ships transporting dangerous materials giving 
prior notification to costal States. Denmark, Norway and Sweden require foreign 
warships to make prior notification before entering their respective territorial seas. 
Since 1991, the Canadian Government has approved the United States’ application 
for passage of nuclear-powered submarines through Canada’s internal waters. 
Another important example is found in the draft of the Protocol on the Prevention 
of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Trans-boundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal, signed in Izmir, Turkey in October 1996. Article 6 of 
the Protocol requires ships in transit passage to obtain permission from the transit 
State prior to passage through its territorial sea. According to Paragraph 4, Article 
6, the transit State will pay due attention to the act of transit passage of the ship in 
transit passage based on its prior application. Recent research shows States have 
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differing practices of prior notification of ships in transit passage. States requiring 
only prior notification are Canada, Djibouti, Pakistan, Portugal and the United Arab 
Emirates. States that require authorization before passage include Egypt, Guinea, 
Iran, Malaysia, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the Republic of Yemen. States 
that do not permit the passage of such ships regardless of prior notification include 
Argentina, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Venezuela.33 
It can be seen that a large number of State practices require ships transporting 
nuclear materials through territorial seas to give prior notification. If such practices, 
powerful enough to prevent ships carrying nuclear materials from entering 
their territorial sea or exclusive economic zones, continues into the future, their 
significance could considerably change and promote the establishment of a new 
international law for the  obligation of prior notification. Additionally, once 
relevant lawsuits are filed, these State practices may be considered as evidence 
of international customary law that establishes the obligation of prior notification 
by a relevant court or the arbitration court. Furthermore, interpreting the relevant 
UNCLOS provisions, these State practices may also be considered and recognized 
by a relevant court or the arbitration court. This is so because, in accordance with 
the provision of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
1969, any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation shall be considered an 
important factor of the interpretation of this treaty.34
A large number of State practices have made the ships carrying these 
substances fearful in choosing shipping routes. In the 1990s, when over 40 States 
were fiercely opposed, ships gradually began avoiding entering into the territorial 
sea of any those States. In particular, transportation routes in 1999 bypassed not 
only the Malacca Straits and territorial seas of Southeast Asian States, but also 
Panama Canal.35
Therefore, the large number of national practices requiring prior notification 
should pay close attention to the international community. Additionally, relevant 
States shall require, as they have previously done, ships carrying nuclear materials 
to give prior notification before entering the territorial sea of States rather than 
33   Jon M. Van Dyke, The Legal Regime Governing Sea Transport of Ultrahazardous 
Radioactive Materials, Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 33, 2002, pp. 
77~108.
34     The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31(3)(b). 
35     Radioactive Sea Shipment, at http://www.nci.org/seatrans.htm, 24 June 2006.
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using a clandestine transport lane. As a transit State for the ships carrying nuclear 
materials, China shall take the same stance and use the same national practice 
as Pacific and other coastal States by requiring prior notification and opposing 
clandestine transportation of nuclear materials.
IV. Influences on China Imposed by Clandestine
      Transportation of Nuclear Materials by Sea and 
      China’s Countermeasures
A. Influences on China Imposed by Clandestine Transportation 
    of Nuclear Materials by Sea
China is a transit State for Japanese ships carrying nuclear materials. In 
fact, the shipping routes of navigation used by Japan to carry highly radioactive 
spent nuclear fuel from nine Japanese electricity companies pass through the 
Taiwan Straits to the U.K. and France.36 On at least occasion, the transportation 
ship traversed the South China Sea after passing Malacca Straits and returned to 
Japan, bypassing Taiwan Island.37 China’s South China Sea is a semi-enclosed 
sea as defined in the UNCLOS, which features poor self-cleaning capacity due to 
constraints of its special geographic conditions, making it easier to accumulate 
pollutants and suffer from pollution, classifying it as a “vulnerable ecosystem.” 
The Taiwan Strait, used for international navigation, measures approximately 350 
nautical miles on its south end, making it considerably wider than the north end, 
which measures only about 135 nautical miles. Currently, pursuant to pertinent laws 
and regulations promulgated by China Mainland and China Taiwan, respectively, 
have each delimited their own territorial sea, contiguous zone and exclusive 
economic zones extending for 200 nautical miles across the Taiwan Strait. Nuclear 
materials, whether passing through the South China Sea or Taiwan Straits, will 
cause catastrophic consequences to the marine environment when an incident 
occurs, with the capability of destroying the living resources found in those waters. 
These consequences will also impose long-term negative influences on the financial 
36    Kuen-chen FU, Essays on International Law of the Sea, Xiamen: Xiamen University Press, 
2004, p. 368. (in Chinese)
37   Zhao Yajuan, Legal Considerations on Clandestine Transportation of Ultra-hazardous 
Nuclear Substance by Japan, China Oceans Law Review, No. 1, 2005. (in Chinese).
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production and lives of citizens across the Taiwan Strait.
B. China’s Countermeasures
The author advocates that both sides across Taiwan Straits and Southeast Asian 
States cooperate with each other and take the following measures against Japan’s 
clandestine transportation of nuclear materials:
1. Delimitation of “Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas”
The author proposes that China and relevant States file an application to the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) for delimiting South China Sea Waters 
and Taiwan Straits Sea Waters as a “Particularly Sensitive Sea Area” (PSSA). 
Designating these waters as PSSA is a means to manage the seawaters beyond 
territorial sea of coastal States that have vulnerable navigation environments. 
The IMO defines a PSSA as “an area that needs special protection through action 
by IMO because of its significance for recognized ecological, socio-economic, 
or scientific attributes where such attributes may be vulnerable to damage by 
international shipping activities.”38 Once a sea area is approved as a PSSA, a State 
can control activities in these waters with special and additional measures regarding 
shipping routes, compulsory ship reporting systems, and ship traffic service. The 
author proposes taking this action due to the inherently dangerous characteristic 
of transporting nuclear materials. The special hydrological features of the Taiwan 
Straits and the special geological environment of the South China Sea require 
protection. First, taking action to delimit these two areas as PSSAs is an enforced 
port regulation measure that is not prejudicial to the principal of the freedom of 
navigation. Despite the stipulations of execution in Chapter VI of the UNCLOS, 
that a costal State can only enact laws and regulations that comply with generally 
recognized global rules and standards, established by acting through competent 
international organizations or diplomatic conferences for its exclusive economic 
zone, an exception exists in Paragraph 6, Article 211. This exception allows the 
costal State to make a proposal to the IMO. The proposal must be a request to 
take special compulsory measures to prevent pollution by vessels. These measures 
cannot have the practical effect of denying, hampering, or impairing the right of 
38     Annex 2, Assembly Resolution A. 927(22), Guidelines for the Designation of Special Areas 
under MARPOL73/78 and Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly 
Sensitive Sea Areas, Adopted on 29 November 2001, A 22/Res. 927.
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navigational ships. As of July 13, 2004, the IMO has approved three PSSAs, which 
are the Baltic Sea Waters, Galapagos Islands (Ecuador) and Canary Islands Sea 
Wasters (Spain).39
As one of the busiest waterways in the world, the South China Sea features 
concentrated islands, wide and narrow straits used as vital communication 
lines, crowded and narrow estuaries, densely-populated countries with a high 
demand for ocean fishes, rich but decreasing coral reefs, sea grass and mangrove 
resources. These waterways are also home to the phenomenon of clandestine 
transportation of hazardous substances, including nuclear materials, which create 
unique environmental characteristics. China has a full standing to apply to the 
IMO for delimiting it as a PSSA. As a result, help will be offered by international 
organizations for delimiting special shipping lanes for transporting nuclear 
materials by sea, taking compulsory port regulation measures or establishing 
reporting system in addition to attention paid by China and adjacent countries.
2. Regional Cooperation
In addition to applying for delimitation of PSSA to the IMO, another solution 
is for the regional cooperation of implementing joint regulation measures by port 
States.
As mentioned above, with its geographic particularity, the South China 
Sea is consistent with the definition of a semi-enclosed sea as described by the 
UNCLOS, offering a basis of and conditions for regional cooperation. However, 
due to historical reasons, territorial controversy over the South China Sea waters 
exists as well as disputes over islands in South China Sea among neighboring 
countries. Two important straits connect the South China Sea and the high seas – 
the Taiwan Straits and the Malacca Straits. The Taiwan Straits is a sensitive area in 
terms of diplomatic and military affairs due to the “Taiwan Issue.” Malacca Straits 
is of great military significance. Cooperation in the Malacca Straits is complicated 
because it is controlled and penetrated by external powers. Accomplishing 
cooperation in these sensitive areas will involve law enforcement and diplomatic 
negotiations. However, disputes among States will likely threaten and/or suspend 
regional cooperation. The fundamental reasons of the controversy are due to 
diversified historical and cultural backgrounds among this region, as well as present 
differences of political and economic development levels.
39    At http://www.sdmsa.gov.cn/n435777/n435800/n435827/n435858/n435866/4543.html, 24 
June 2006.
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However, this does not mean that southeast Asian States cannot reach common 
interests regarding the issues of transporting nuclear materials, because nuclear 
pollution reaches beyond boundaries. Therefore, these States may find common 
ground for cooperation on the issue of clandestine transportation of nuclear 
materials by Japan. Cooperation could take the form of “shelving differences.” 
The Chinese government proposed, “shelving differences and seeking joint 
development,” as a means for cooperation. The view of this proposal is that joint 
regulations for transporting nuclear materials by port States and the historically 
persistent territorial disputes are dealt with separately. By implementing this 
proposal, States would agree to cooperate by agreeing on transport methods and 
shipping lanes used for transporting nuclear materials.
The key issue with this proposal concerns Japan. Japan keeps transportation 
routes of nuclear materials to its cooperating States – France and the U.K. – strictly 
confidential. As a result, it is impossible to initiate any announcement to the 
Japanese Government port regulations imposed by China and other coastal States, 
or emergency actions, if nothing is known about Japan’s transportation of spent 
nuclear fuel. Therefore, China and other southeastern Asian States must negotiate 
with Japan to advocate for regional cooperation. Negotiations are also important 
in order to convey to Japan that joint port regulation will strengthen regulations 
to prevent any occurrence of a nuclear incident at sea rather than limiting or 
prohibiting the right of passage of Japanese ships carrying nuclear materials. Where 
possible, these regulations would require Japan to submit reports and all necessary 
documents for ships carrying spent nuclear fuel to the coastal States and to accept 
onboard inspections conducted by the coastal States.
If the application for delimiting the South China Sea or Taiwan Straits as a 
PSSA is not approved, or before the approval is granted, an alternative would be 
to use regional cooperation by initiating regional negotiations. By establishing the 
pattern of joint regulation by port States while exerting pressure on Japan, it might 
be inclined to join the regional cooperation arrangement.
3. Implementation of Traffic Separation Scheme by 
Strengthening Cross-Straits Cooperation
Across both of Taiwan Straits, China Mainland and China Taiwan shall 
cooperate with each other through negotiations to establish a traffic separation 
scheme (TSS). Article 22 of the UNCLOS provides for that States can “require 
foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through its territorial sea to 
use such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as it may designate or prescribe 
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for the regulation of the passage of ships.” Paragraph 2 of the same article stipulates 
that “in particular, tankers, nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or 
other inherently dangerous or noxious substances or materials may be required to 
confine their passage to such sea lanes.” The passage of nuclear materials through 
the Taiwan Straits imposes profound consequences on the people across the Taiwan 
Straits and the marine environment surrounding the Straits. Professor Kuen-chen 
FU made this proposal in his discussion about the legal status of Taiwan Straits Sea 
waters.40 The implementation of the TSS will provide the following benefits:
First, designations of special shipping routes can reduce the passage of ships 
through the territorial sea of transit States. Relevant States can determine the 
shipping routes for these ships by agreement. Together with the precautionary 
principle, designation of special shipping routes provides aid for the prompt and 
timely response of relevant States in the event of any nuclear incident. Quicker 
response times by States to nuclear incidents can only happen if States are well 
informed of the shipping routes, which is not possible if transportation routes of 
ships remain confidential.
Second, special designation of routes will keep ships from entering 
environmentally sensitive areas thereby minimizing environmental damages of 
nuclear incidents. Accounting for weather concerns in these special routes will steer 
ships away from seawater encountering bad weather. For example, the weather in 
seawater routes located between the Equator and the Tropic of Cancer are better 
than the Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope seawater.
Third, the designation of special shipping routes will reduce of the number 
of ships in transit passage. Only certain ships would pass through the designated 
shipping routes while other merchant ships would take ordinary shipping lanes, 
thereby considerably decreasing the chance of ship collisions.
Therefore, we propose that far-sighted people across Taiwan Straits shall 
cooperate with each other first with regard to the issue of traffic separation scheme, 
which is also the most practical and feasible way.
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40    Kuen-chen FU, Essays on International Law of the Sea, Xiamen: Xiamen University Press, 
2004, pp. 359~377. (in Chinese)
